

論文

Ceasefire, Peace and Democratization: A Comparative Study on Indonesia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Rwanda.

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Abstract: Many conflicts could be solved successfully by offering ceasefire agreements to the opposite parties in certain parts of the world. These include, in particular, the civil wars between the Indonesia government and GAM insurgency, and the Philippines government with MILF separatists. Interestingly, some ceasefire agreements were actually able to terminate the war, followed by peaceful co-existence, without secession. Thus, given the uneven record of success of ceasefire agreements, it is important to study multiple cases of these agreements and their outcomes. This paper seeks to determine why Indonesia was able to successfully negotiate a ceasefire agreement, and how that experience compares to similar efforts in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Rwanda. This paper is a form of qualitative research which analyzes and compares the peace process in four different locations. This study also used documentary research, including information collected from related texts, journals, and research reports. This study found that the results of ceasefire agreement negotiations can be classified into the following: Personal action, deadlocked, and phenomena. The Indonesia case is classified as the “phenomena” type because, during the ceasefire negotiations, Aceh was devastated by the December, 2004 Tsunami. After that trauma, the Acehnese and Javanese decided to compromise, share, and respect each other in recognition of their common humanity rather than continue to live in conflict. The first steps in implementing the ceasefire agreement include the Indonesian government’s release of political prisoners and removal of military and police from the conflict zone. This inspired the separatists to disband their militia and turn their efforts to implement the peace process.

Keywords: ceasefire agreement, comparative studies, transitional democracy

Introduction

When traveling on the path toward peace, the ceasefire agreement between warring parties can be a bridge to success. The ceasefire paves the way to for humanitarian assistance to victims of the conflict, establishing democratic institutions, and holding elections. Though the road to a ceasefire is full of obstacles, there are some example of successful and lasting ceasefire negotiations. This paper compares the outcome of ceasefire

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agreements in Rwanda, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, with a focus on the Aceh separatist movement in western Sumatra, Indonesia. The author concludes that both the December 2004 Tsunami and the intention of the Aceh people contributed to the success of the ceasefire with the Indonesian government.

Background of Ceasefire Agreements

A ceasefire agreement is a contract to temporally halt combat between warring parties. It can also be the first step toward a democratization process. In WWI, the Axis and Allied powers agreed to halt hostilities on Christmas Eve, 1914. For one night, the rival forces shared food and sang songs together. In another example, in Afghanistan, the government proposed a ceasefire agreement to the Taliban to be observed during the ritual of Eid-Al Adha in June 20, 2018. After the end of the ritual, they also organized a peace initiative mediated by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Tadamichi Yamamoto announced that “A mutual ceasefire would further the prospects for talks to take place to end the conflict and find a lasting political settlement.”⁽¹⁾

Ceasefire agreements have helped to stimulate warring parties to end hostilities for some better purpose, starting, in some cases, with a demilitarization zone. In many cases, the motivation for a ceasefire was the prospect of a war of attrition on both sides with no beneficial outcome for either party. Zartman stated that the rival parties found that they had never met with victory; the more fighting, the greater the loss of benefits for both sides. He described this as: Hurting Stalemates or Ripe moments.⁽²⁾ Thus, a ceasefire agreement could be the only way out of such an impasse. Malin Akebo also described another dimension of a ceasefire agreement as a shift from violence to non-violence, whereby the warring parties might be state and non-state actors, rather than state and state, due to the prevalence of civil wars or intrastate wars around the world.⁽³⁾

However, the ceasefire agreement is a dynamic process, because some actions need to occur after signing in order to render the agreement a success. In other words, the period immediately after a ceasefire agreement is signed is a crucial moment to see whether the agreement will be honored. As Akebo observed, the outcome of a ceasefire agreement can be classified as follows: Return to hostilities; protracted negotiations, maintenance of the ‘Status Quo’ (i.e., in a state of neither peace or war), and descent into a comprehensive war. A successful

(1) Fardin W. UN Mission Welcomes Afghan Government’s Announcement of Eid Holiday Ceasefire. (2018) [online] Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/08/1017482>. Retrieved on August 21, 2019.

(2) William I.Z. (2008) The timing of peace initiatives: Hurting stalemates and ripe moments. In John D and Mac G.R. (eds.), *Contemporary peacemaking: Conflict, peace processes and post-war reconstruction*, 2nd edition. Palgrave MacMillan. pp.22-35.

(3) Malin A (2016) *Ceasefire Agreement and Peace Process: A Comparative Study*. Routledge Press. Introduction.

outcome depends on the effectiveness of the negotiations and may include resolving substantive issues, introduction of international mediation, and achieving the willingness of both warring parties.

Ceasefire, Peace and Democratization

A ceasefire agreement is usually the first step in a peace process. When the warring parties sign their names on the ceasefire agreement, it indicates that both parties are willing to demilitarize and (at least temporarily) stop hostilities. However, it could only be said that the ceasefire agreement changed the situation from bad to good if the rival parties remain committed to the terms of the ceasefire. In general, if the warring parties are ready to comply with the substantive issues of a ceasefire agreement, both parties continue the dialogue to gain a better understanding of what is required. Importantly, democratic institutions should be established as soon as possible after the ceasefire agreement is signed. That will help to protect human rights and freedom from fear.

While a ceasefire, ensuing peace, and democratization can be seen as a logical continuum, in practice, achieving a sustainable peace is rarely a straightforward process. In many of today's conflicts, one of the warring parties is a non-government entity which is not equipped with a large store of weapons or numerous skillful troops. Instead, the non-state actor is often fighting for autonomy or religious freedom, and its citizens are willing to die for the cause. The other side is often the ruling government, which is superior in terms of weapons and troops. Few central governments are willing to give in to separatist movements, no matter how small, since they fear a domino effect in which other territories will also seek autonomy if one succeeds. Thus, some form of negotiation is the only viable approach to avoid protracted hostilities or annihilation of the weaker party.

Question and Framework

This study examined four cases, using the following key questions: Why did Indonesia succeed in negotiating a successful ceasefire, and what could be learnt from the case of Indonesia compared to the other case-study countries? The argument of this paper is as follows: Some ceasefire agreements resulted in even worse violence than was the situation before the ceasefire. Other alternatives between warring parties should be considered as a precondition of a ceasefire agreement, such as economic development, establishing democratic institutions, or the shift of military role from security or repression to humanitarian assistance.

Indonesia

The ceasefire negotiations between GAM (Islamist Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Indonesian central government did not go smoothly as first. Aceh struggled to build a separatist movement for autonomous rights, including to independently determine educational policy and apply customary law. Historically, after the end of WWII, Aceh anticipated seceding from Indonesia after the Netherlands relinquished control of the country in 1945. However, Aceh did not achieve independence, and it remained a province under the control of the central government. Finally, during the administration of Sukarno, Aceh received 'special autonomous status' but not independence per se. Suharto was trying to implement a policy called "New Order Regime" with a concentration on academic policy, state development by elites, and centralization of natural resource development. As a result, Aceh became an oil supplier for the government; however, the government distributed only 5 percent of revenue from Aceh oil to the province. This uneven economic distribution was one factor which re-ignited the movement for full independence. Weapons were provided to the separatists from Thailand and Malaysia. The Indonesian government mounted a counter-offensive, but the Aceh people became even more determined to achieve full autonomy.⁽⁴⁾

Another factor which energized GAM was the pressure from the central government for the Acehnese to conform with mainstream Indonesian culture, language and religious customs. However, many of these practices were contrary to Aceh culture which had been passed down through countless generations. Because of the sprawling nation of islands and ethnic groups, Suharto was concerned that, if Aceh was allowed to secede, then other sub-groups of the Indonesian population would aspire for the same, thereby balkanizing the fourth largest country (by population) in the world. Thus, government policy of nation building attempted to pressure all ethnic groups to assimilate with mainstream Indonesian culture, and this was marketed to the public as a national security imperative. During this time, GAM became stronger through its civil and military branches, and they were able to mount effective guerrilla retaliation to national government efforts to tighten controls. Over time, the central government realized that it was a futile effort to subdue the Aceh people, and began to seriously consider some sort of compromise.

Previously, the government had tried to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with the Aceh separatists; the first two failed when nationwide martial law was imposed by the government. However, the third time was successful and happened to coincide with (or partially result from) the December 2004 Tsunami disaster. It could be said that both parties "turned a crisis into opportunity" by shifting their focus to tend to the victims of the Tsunami and begin the reconstruction efforts for the province. To enable the influx of relief aid and agencies, GAM

(4) Malin A (2016). *Ceasefire Agreement and Peace Process: A Comparative Study*. Routledge Press. Chapter 3.

immediately declared a ceasefire, and soon after, peace talks began, mediated by the Finnish Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). As a result of negotiations, GAM gained self-administration rights which were codified in a signed MOU with the Indonesian Government. This was followed by the withdrawal of government troops, and GAM also drew down its wartime militia and deactivated most of its weapons cache.⁽⁵⁾

Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar were selected as comparison case studies due to some distinct similarities with Indonesia. In particular, the national government military was pitted against groups of its own citizens who were in some form of rebellion. However, despite the military advantage of the former, the conflicts were prolonged and, at times, intractable.

In the case of Rwanda, the government eventually overcame the rebels, but in a quite compromising way, and the government used more authoritarianism in order to restrain the rebel uprising. By contrast, in Sri Lanka, the government directly confronted the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which received both training and weapons from ethnic Tamils in India, which helped prolong the conflict. The Sri Lanka case was complex and required a more comprehensive solution to achieve peace. In the end, both Rwandan and Sri Lankan governments were able to defeat the rebellions but, as a by-product, the Rwandan government became more authoritarian.

Sri Lanka

In the Sri Lanka case, the Sinhala and Tamil people are the two main distinctive ethnic groups of the country. The Sinhala is the majority ethnic group in Sri Lanka, with approximately 75 percent of the population in 2012.⁽⁶⁾ When the government of Sri Lanka declared its independence from British rule, it also announced that Sinhalese would be the primary language under the Sinhala Only Act, 1956. This inflamed tensions with the Tamil minority who felt that the Act forced them to adopt Sinhala culture, and suppressed use of the Tamil language and Hindu religion. As an act of defiance, a large number of Sri Lankan Tamils moved up into the mountainous areas in order to retain their sense of cultural identity. The government had also enacted discriminatory policies which favored the majority, e.g., that only the Sinhala were eligible to study at the university level. This was an attempt to reverse the effect of British rule which had favored Tamils in education and administration during colonial times.⁽⁷⁾

(5) Indonesia-Aceh. (2008) Accord Insight 20 [online] Available from: https://www.c-r.org/downloads/AccordInsight_WomenBuildingPeace_IndonesiaAceh.pdf. Retrieved on July 10, 2019.

(6) Sri Lanka Population and Housing Census, Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka, (2011) [online] Available from: <http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.php?fileName=pop42&gp=Activities&tpl=3>. Retrieved on December 23, 2018.

(7) Malin. A. (2013) The Politics of Ceasefire, Ceasefire Agreements, and the Peace Process in Aceh and Sri Lanka. Research Report, Department of Political Science. Umea University. 4: 149-150.

Due to unfair treatment from the government's policy, the Tamils established an anti-government movement called the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The aim of LTTE was to negotiate with the government for equality and partition of the country into north (Tamil) from the south (Sinhala). This was clearly unacceptable to the central government, and war ensued. Tamils in India were a main source of outside help for LTTE, particularly for ammunitions and training. The Sri Lankan government responded in kind by building up its armed forces and deploying them to the north region of the country. While the Tamil population was approximately 15 percent of all Sri Lankans, they occupied 30 percent of the land.

At that time, some viewed the central administration in Sri Lanka as a "pseudo state" which had no recognized self-governing body. Instead, Sri Lanka was composed of political institutions in order to process visas, collect taxes, and fund the military and an independent court. Furthermore, Sri Lanka Muslims sided with the Tamil minority. The central government felt it could not allow an additional separatist movement and allowed Sri Lankan Muslims to form a political party -- the Srilanka Muslim Congress (SMC)⁽⁸⁾ in order to entice Muslims into the mainstream and away from the LTTE.

Over time, the warring parties eventually entered into peace negotiations which resulted in the "Tamil-Sinhala Pact," in 1957 initiated by Prime Minister Solomon Banderanaika from the Srilanka Freedom Party (SLFP). His counterpart was the Tamil representative Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam. Nearly a decade later, an amended peace pact was signed with the Tamil Dudley Senanayake-Chelvanayagam in 1965. The content of Banderanaika and Chelvanayagam pact (BC pact) consisted of improving equality between Tamil and Sinhala. However, the pact was abruptly broken after the assassination of Banderanaika⁽⁹⁾. At this time, the Tamils also formed its political arm named the "Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF)" with the purpose to declare a special autonomous area. In 1978, the government banned LTTE from registering as a political party in the up-coming elections, and designated the Tamil area in the north of the country as a danger zone. Thus, despite the attempts to reach a peace deal, the conflict continued to simmer and could easily be triggered into all-out war. India had tried to be a mediator, however, India was unable to serve as a neutral entity since its own Tamil population in the south of the country was fueling the Sri Lanka Tamil separatists.

LTTE was steadfast in demanding some form of autonomy for Sri Lankan Tamils and withdrawal of Sri Lankan military as pre-conditions for resuming peace talks. India tried once again to intervene and sent in a so-called "Indian Peace Keeping Force" (IPKF). However, the Sinhala-controlled government insisted on

(8) Ibid.,

(9) Timelines: History of the Conflict in Sri Lanka: No More tears (June 27, 2006) [online] Available from: <http://archive.pov.org/nomoretears/timeline/> Retrieved on July 11, 2019.

the complete withdrawal of the IPKF. During the beginning of the decade of the 1990s, the peace process in Sri Lanka became increasingly complicated, and was further disrupted by the assassination of India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, since it was suspected that the LTTE was behind the assassination (in retaliation for India's sending in the IPKF). This event also interrupted the flow of arms and other support to LTTE from Tamil India. At around the same time, President Ranasinghe Premadasa was killed by LTTE suicide bombers. Ms. Kumaratunga, the new president, administrated Sri Lanka quite differently from former-president Premadasa, encouraging more international involvement with the purpose of acquiring major weapon suppliers. The LTTE was condemned by the USA and UK. Kumaratunga also allowed Sri Lanka Tamils to set up their own political party in the hope that this could be an olive branch and a path to peace talks. After an exchange of dozens of communiques between Kumaratunga and the leader of the LTTE, peace talks were resumed in 1994, with a representative from Norway as mediator. The negotiations dragged on for nearly a decade before a ceasefire agreement was signed in 2003.

While this agreement should have put an end to the war, the LTTE kept launching attacks. A report from the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) documented the LTTE attacks. Consequently, an "International Crisis Group" declared the ceasefire agreement to have been violated, and the Sri Lanka government felt it had no other choice than to re-engage in hostilities with the LTTE.

In 2005, the policy of the Sri Lankan government shifted to reduce international involvement, and built up military forces the north to target other separatist groups (not the LTTE). Following this, the Autarkic Economic Development program was launched as a self-sufficient economic system.⁽¹⁰⁾ However, the transition to a more inclusive democratic environment in Sri Lanka was not to be easily operationalized as long as there were separatist hold-outs. O'Donnell and Schmitter stated that "the existence of democracy hinges on the government acceptance to be replaced by other interest groups."⁽¹¹⁾ Sri Lanka government culminated its authority, never relented to its hostile's attitude and participation. Also, it can be observed that the previous series of ceasefire agreements in Sri Lanka was like a ritual; i.e., not based on sincere intentions. Further, international involvement made the situation worse and also obstructed the democratization process. For instance, Tamil India reinforced the Sri Lankan rebels with weapons and other material support. However, the

(10) Jonathan G. and Oliver W. (2009) The Limit of Liberal Peace Building. *International Engagement in the Sri Lanka Peace Process*. *Journal of Intervention and State Building*, 3 (3): 303-323. David L, John H and Nick M. (2018) "Illiberal Peace? Authoritarian Approach as a Conflict Management. *Cooperation and Conflict*. *Sage Journal*.1: 21; and Giulia P (2015) Winning wars, building (illiberal) peace? The rise (and possible fall) of a victor's peace in Rwanda and Sri Lanka. *Third World Quarterly* [online] Available from: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1058150>.

(11) Guillermo O'D. and Phillipe C. S. (1986) In Laurence W. (eds). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp.16-17.

strength of the LTTE was waning and, eventually, the LTTE succumbed to the relentless pressure from the Sri Lankan military, and surrendered in 2009.

Rwanda

As in Sri Lanka, the Rwandan population is also comprised of two distinct ethnic groups: Hutu and Tutsi.⁽¹²⁾ Some described this mixture as a result of migration and partial assimilation, i.e., by sharing the same language.⁽¹³⁾ Others proposed that the Hutu were the indigenous group in the area who were primarily farmers, while the Tutsi were migrant cattle herders who moved into the Hutu area.⁽¹⁴⁾ Despite being a minority of the population, the Tutsi ascended to higher economic status and, politically, were able to dominate the Hutu. Thus, the conditions were created for festering resentment and eventual eruption into violent conflict.

In order to promote better co-existence between Hutu and Tutsi, one possible solution was to reduce the privileges of the Tutsi in society and try to achieve a more equitable balance with the Hutu, as an attempt to defuse the growing resentment of the Hutu people. As one attempt to pacify the situation, Hutu were appointed to several key administrative positions, but that also provoked discontent among Tutsi.

Hutu were backed by the Belgian government, and this gave the Hutu confidence to organize a more violent opposition. Initially, the Hutu conducted ambushes of groups of Tutsi, with a reciprocal response by the Tutsi. Rwanda achieved independence in 1962, and the result of the first election was a landslide for the Hutu, who significantly outnumbered the Tutsi in the population. After this development, relations between Hutu and Tutsi deteriorated sharply.

In order to protect themselves from the increasingly belligerent Hutu, a faction of Rwandan Tutsi established the Rwanda Patriot Front (RPF), as an armed force to reclaim territory seized by the Hutu on the border between Rwanda and Burundi. The Rwandan army, led by Hutu, retaliated, with backing from France and (then) Zaire. Tutsi employed hit and run strategies and other guerilla warfare tactics launched from the mountainous areas. However, with their fewer numbers, the Tutsi could never defeat the Rwanda army. As an attempt to resolve the impasse, a multiparty coalition and the RPF proposed a ceasefire to the Rwandan government in 1992.⁽¹⁵⁾

(12) Luis, J. R.; et al. (2004). The Levant versus the Horn of Africa: Evidence for Bidirectional Corridors of Human Migrations, *American Journal of Human Genetics*. 74 (3): 532-544.

(13) Gérard P. (1999). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (2nd ed.), Fountain Publishers Limited. p.16.

(14) Jean P.G. (2003). *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of History*. MIT, Press. p.69.

(15) Gérard P. (1999). p.150.

Meanwhile, the Hutu continued accumulating more military power and began implementing a campaign of mass murder.⁽¹⁶⁾ The Tutsi remained willing to have a peace talks, despite retaliating to government attacks. Eventually, representatives from the Tutsi and Hutu signed a ceasefire agreement called the “Arusha Accord” in August 1993.⁽¹⁷⁾ However, the accord did not achieve peace, despite the fact that the economy improved and casualties declined. Some Tutsi were even appointed to senior government, e.g., Deputy Ministry of Interior.⁽¹⁸⁾

The full-scale genocidal civil war was triggered by the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana, the Hutu President, when the plane he was on was shot down. This formally ended the Arusha Accord, and hordes of Tutsi fled to neighboring countries such as Tanzania, Zaire and Uganda.⁽¹⁹⁾ The ethnic cleansing that followed is estimated to have resulted in from 500,000 to one million Tutsi deaths and an estimated rape of 250,000 – 300,000 Tutsi women.⁽²⁰⁾ Meanwhile, the RPF was gaining strength and toppled the Hutu-led Rwandan government in July 1994. However, much of the damage of the civil war had been done, and there was economic dislocation and spread of infectious disease. Over the years, the RPF has maintained its control of Rwanda, with electoral victories in 2003, 2010, and 2017, and Paul Kagame took office as President, who has since ruled using an authoritarian form of government to prevent a repeat of the Tutsi genocide.⁽²¹⁾

Myanmar

Ever since 1962, Myanmar had been ruled by an authoritarian military junta. Coinciding with student rebellion in other parts of the world in the late 1980s, students from Rangoon University and other academic institutions organized mass protests to military rule on August 8, 1988 (hence, called the “8888” uprising). The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) used force to break up the riots resulting in an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 deaths, and tens of thousands fled to live with the various ethnic groups with a history of opposition to the central government in Rangoon. This violence attracted global attention and the SLORC was challenged by the international community about its legitimacy to rule the diverse people of Myanmar. As a move to pre-empt a counter-offensive by separatist groups in the hinterland, SLORC offered a ceasefire to nearly all ethnic groups in 1989. The first group to sign the ceasefire agreement was the ethnic minority in

(16) Ibid., pp.173-4.

(17) Gérard P. (1999). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (2nd ed.). Fountain Publishers Limited. p.150.

(18) Mahmood M (2002) *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton University Press. pp.168-169.

(19) Ibid., pp.160-1.

(20) Binaifer N. (1996). *Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*. Human Rights Watch.

(21) Hutus killed Rwanda President Juvenal Habyarimana. BBC News. January 12, 2010 [online] Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8453832.stm>. Retrieved on December 19, 2018.

Kokang, located along the Myanmar-China border.⁽²²⁾ The Kokang, along with its troop (Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)) was strategically chosen since it was a major source of illegal narcotic production in the region.⁽²³⁾ Also, the government's prioritization for selection of groups to offer the ceasefire agreement depended on the size of their area and quantity of troops.⁽²⁴⁾ As more groups signed the agreement, others were persuaded to join in as well.

After the end of Cold War, China had retreated from the Kokang area, and that was another factor which motivated the Kokang and MNDAA to sign the ceasefire agreement. In 2010, the Myanmar government designated self-administration rights to Kokang, Pa O, Pa Laung, and Naga groups, among others. These actions convinced other ethnic groups who had resisted signing the ceasefire agreement to reconsider. However, a number of minority groups still refused to sign due to lack of trust that the central government would honor its side of the bargain. They suspected that the Myanmar government would encroach on territory of the ethnic group, extract natural resources, and occupy land. Importantly, in some areas, the government promised to implement infrastructure development projects as an exchange for signing the ceasefire agreement. These projects included a hydro-electrical dam or jade mining, with China and Myanmar as investment partners. Inevitably, the ethnic groups which "administered" the land where these projects occurred did not reap any monetary benefits from the development. Unfortunately, the projects also destroyed the environment and way of living of the locals. Indeed, sometimes the government and ceasefire signatories resumed hostilities over land rights and human rights.

The ceasefire agreements by the Myanmar government and various ethnic groups created only the illusion of peace. Johan Galtung (1969) categorized peace into two types: negative and positive.⁽²⁵⁾ The difference between two types is that the former is achieved by physical gain in a shorter timeframe, e.g., stopping abusive action, reducing death toll from some diseases, or offering a ceasefire agreement. By contrast, the latter type of peace is achieved by structural changes such as identity, cultural, language, and religion, and this takes longer time with gradual acceptance of compromise. However, a negative peace is fragile and can easily erupt into war; a positive peace is more stable and sustainable. Thus, the ceasefire agreements in Myanmar are characterized as a type of negative peace which do not address the root cause of the problems.

Besides, the ceasefire agreements actually created more internal and factional splits between ethnic groups

(22) Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d.) Myanmar National Truth and Justice Party. [online] Available from: <https://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/1681> Retrieved on November 26, 2019.

(23) Ashley S (2008). *Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict*. Taylor & Francis. p.140.

(24) *Ibid.*, p.133.

(25) Johan G (1969) Violence, Peace and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*. 6 (3): 167-191.

who signed and those who had not. This posed a threat toward political effectiveness. Some of the ethnic groups rejected the policy of the government which promoted the concept of “One country -- one race -- one army” which seemed to designate all ethnic groups as illegitimate.⁽²⁶⁾ Therefore, some non-signatories persisted in rejecting both the bilateral and nationwide ceasefire agreements. Many did not trust the promise of the government that “if all ethnic groups signed, the government would set the stage for political discussion.” Instead, some saw the strategy of the government as pitting different ethnic groups against each other.⁽²⁷⁾ In short, the government has its ability to control the people inside its borders in a myriad of ways, i.e., by divide and conquer. That said, a ceasefire agreement is the only tool available to the government to gain respect and legitimacy from the international community, and to cooperate with foreign investors in developing the land and resources made available by the ceasefires. This weakened the position of the hold-out non-signatories.

President Thein Sein offered a new framework of plural ceasefire agreements (i.e., National Ceasefire Agreement, or NCA) in place of the bilateral ceasefire agreements, as a strategy to entice some non-signatories. The NCA attracted some ethnic groups, and talks continued with the Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO).⁽²⁸⁾ The EAO was able to consolidate ethnic-controlled areas, and this gave the group leverage to negotiate a favorable bilateral agreement. The Myanmar government also promised to resume political dialogue if all ethnic groups already signed the NCA.

From the above case studies, the ceasefire agreements could be separated into two groups: One category is the ceasefire agreement as a sincere step toward peace, as in the case of Indonesia. The other category is a ceasefire agreement that is a make-shift approach to temporarily suspend hostilities, as in the cases of Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda. In sum, achieving a ceasefire agreement might not guarantee a path to peace; that success depends on the intention and sincerity of the signatories. In the case of Indonesia, the government and GAM chose to end the fighting to gain mutual benefits of economic development as well as the focus on assistance for victims of the Tsunami disaster.

(26) Phil T (2015). Ceasefire Broken before it began. Bangkok Post [online] Available from: <https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/special-reports/750028/ceasefire-broken-before-it-began>. Retrieved on November 26, 2019.

(27) Briefing No. 158 (2019) Myanmar: A Violent Push Shake Ceasefire Negotiations. Crisis Group Asia Briefing [online] Available from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b158-myanmar-violent-push-shake-ceasefire-negotiations>. Retrieved on November 26, 2019.

(28) EAO consisted of 21 ethnic groups (some are already leaving and some have just joined the EAO). Since 2015, 8 EAO members had already signed the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA): Karen National Union (KNU), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army (Peace Council) [KNU/KNLA(PC)], Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), Chin National Front (CNF), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), Restoration Council of Shan State (Rcss), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), New Mon State Party (NMSP), and LaHu Democratic Union.

Different Consequences of Achieving a Ceasefire Agreement

The aftermath of a ceasefire agreement can be categorized into three groups: Individual action, Deadlocked, and Phenomena.

The interventions in Rwanda and Sri Lanka are characterized as individual action, as the ceasefire agreements in both states led to the decision of leaders who controlled the civil wars by using armed force to counter the insurgency. Sri Lankan leaders took a long time to neutralize the LTTE, largely because LTTE was supported by Tamils in India. The Sri Lankan government tried to negotiate using peaceful means, but, in the end, the use of force was needed to resolve the decades-old conflict. In Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsi leaders finally met at Arusha, Tanzania to negotiate peace. The government stopped the genocide and attempted to address inequalities by appointing government positions more equitably. For example, initially a Hutu leader was appointed as president and a Tutsi leader acted as vice-president and defense minister. However, Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, took control of the government and then prevailed in general elections ever since. From these two cases, leaders played a vital role to settle the conflict, even though the outcomes of the ceasefire agreements are different. Linz and Stepan questioned why democracies break down, and concluded that the answer did not lie in only economic factors or class struggle.⁽²⁹⁾ Instead, a key reason was the decision of leaders. In some cases, elites wanted to retain their preferred socio-economic status, and consequently offered pacts to military leaders to assume authoritative power as an interim transition to democracy.⁽³⁰⁾

The “Deadlocked” outcome is characterized by the ceasefire agreements between the Myanmar government and separatist ethnic groups. In that case, the government and ethnic groups made use of the ceasefire agreement for their own purposes, rather than the pursuit of common goals, such as peace and democratization. The Myanmar government advertised its ceasefire agreements with ethnic groups as a public display of its legitimacy. Yet, some ethnic groups resisted these overtures due to lack of trust of the military junta. In addition, the government used the ceasefire agreements to fragment the ethnic groups and reduce their bargaining power. Indeed, there is ample evidence that the Myanmar government was never committed to the terms of the ceasefire agreements. Myanmar also pursued a capitalist strategy to neutralize conflict by implementing infrastructure development projects through third parties on land held by ethnic groups with the promise that the local population would benefit from improved quality of life and economic prosperity.

(29) Juan J. L. (1978) *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration*. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp.ix-12.

(30) Guillermo O'D and Philippe S (1986) “Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies,” In Guillermo O'D, Philippe S, and Laurence W (eds). *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*. The Johns Hopkins University Press. part 4. p.19 and p.48.

Lastly, there is the “Phenomena” type of outcome, and this is characterized by the ceasefire agreement between GAM and the Indonesian government. The GAM separatist, or “Free Aceh,” movement sought autonomous rights in the entire Aceh region, including the right to practice their religion, cultural laws, and education methods.⁽³¹⁾ During the mid-1970s, Aceh was granted a form of autonomy, and this allowed the Indonesian government to extract oil and other natural resources in Aceh. However, the Aceh people only received 5 percent of the revenue generated by their natural resources. The uneven economic distribution exacerbated the conflict, sparking a rebellion and counter-insurgency by the government. Initially, the ceasefire agreement did not seem to succeed, and the government imposed martial law, mixed with armed suppression of Aceh rebels. Unexpectedly, the December 2004 Tsunami distracted GAM and the Indonesian government

The table below shows the Comparative Studies on the Onset, Mid-term and Outcome of ceasefire negotiation in Myanmar, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda.

State and non- state group	Myanmar Ethnic Groups	Indonesia GAM	Sri Lanka Tamils and Sri Lanka Hindu	Rwanda Hutu and Tutsi
Effectiveness of the ceasefire negotiations				
1. Time of offering a ceasefire	Since 1989; Kokang and MNDA.	In December 2004 (post-Tsunami), proposed by GAM.	In 2003, Sri Lanka Tamil (LTTE) (with Norway representative) and Sri Lanka Sinhala.	In 1993, Arusha Accord was signed between Hutu, Rwanda and Tutsi, Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).
2. Fighting continues	After agreeing to disarm, they still ambushed each other.	GAM had continued to attack against the government, until Tsunami hit.	The fighting between Sri Lankan Tamils and Sinhala had continued, until Ms. Kumaratunga defeated the LTTE.	After the plane of the Rwandan President had been shot down, a civil war erupted.
3. Outcome of the attempted ceasefire negotiations	In 2015, a national ceasefire agreement (NCA) was proposed, resulting in deadlocked.	GAM had not fulfilled its demand, the government withdrew troops from Aceh.	For ineffective ceasefire agreement, the government ended the civil war by force.	After UNMIR II had provided humanitarian assistance to victims, RPF achieved electoral victory. ⁽³²⁾
4. Classification of the Consequence of achieving Ceasefire Agreement	Deadlocked-Seeking more effective solution.	Phenomena - Most distinguishing situation, when enemies turned into friends.	Personal Action-Political Leader used force at the end.	Personal Action-Head of state became authoritarian leader.

(31) Michael L. R. (2007). “Resources and Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia” The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. World Bank [online] available from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20081030151630/http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/ResourcesRebellion.pdf>. Retrieved November 28, 2019.

(32) Thus, the Tutsi leader (Kagame) and Hutu leader (Bizimunga), formed a coalition government by designating a Hutu leader as President, and a Tutsi leader as Vice President and defense minister.

Analysis: Why Bizimunga Mattered (2000) BBC News. [online] Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/688587.stm>. Retrieved on November 27, 2019.

from their dispute, and this provided enough of a break in hostilities to lead to peace. The eventual ceasefire agreement was first proposed by GAM who gave higher priority to helping victims of the Tsunami and reconstructing the devastated areas. Therefore, an unpredictable natural disaster precipitated the rival parties to sign a ceasefire agreement, which has been sustained to the present.

In short, the conversion from foe to friend has never been easy. Success requires all possible means to overcome the resistance of opposing parties. The case studies have some commonalities, despite clear differences of context and political variables. This article proposed three types of outcomes of ceasefire agreement negotiations: Personal action, Deadlocked and Phenomena. Building trust and the principle of democratization, such as equality, freedom and human rights, should be fostered to create successful ceasefire negotiations.

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